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Neither `Public' nor `Private', `National' nor
`International': Transnational Corporate Governance from
a Legal Pluralist Perspective
Peer Zumbansen*
This paper contends that the challenging nature of the regulation of
global corporate conduct requires an adequately differentiated
approach towards the identification and analysis of the norms in
question. In part I, I review the context of `state intervention' and
`market self-regulation', in which the current discussion of regulatory
responses to the economic/financial crisis and the role of selfregulation occurs, before laying out the concept of `transnational legal
pluralism' in part II. In part III, I argue that an exemplary area such as
corporate governance can best be understood as an instance of
transnational legal pluralism, a field that becomes visible through a
particular methodological lens. In part IV, I conclude by suggesting
how the lessons of such a case study can contribute to an ongoing
theoretical investigation into the nature of global regulatory
governance, using the concept of `rough consensus and running code'.
INTRODUCTION
Much of today's writing on `global governance' presumes a fundamental gap
between the domestic forms, institutions, and instruments of legal regulation
on the one hand and what is perceived as a dramatic regulatory void on the
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 4700 Keele St., Toronto,
Canada M3J 1P3
pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca
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global scale on the other. This anxiety is particularly accentuated with regard
to border-crossing, global corporate activity, which is seen as having over
time successfully escaped the reach of traditional, nation-state-based forms
of regulation. As the literature on the challenges of regulating the conduct of
multinational business corporations (MNCs) has been growing exponentially, the question remains, however, whether or not an answer to this
alleged exhaustion of the regulatory state in the face of global corporate
(mis-)conduct is likely to be found in the extension of the regulatory grasp of
the nation state ± or of international state bodies ± in a kind of `expanded
jurisdiction' sense. By contrast, what appears to emerge from a continuing
assessment by lawyers,1 political scientists,2 and economists3 of the
corporate, labour law, and human rights dimensions of MNC is a growing
awareness of the need to approach the problem from what has fruitfully been
referred to as a `regulatory governance' perspective.4 From this vantage
point the challenge presents itself as no longer one of law's limits (or as the
`end of the state'), but as one which is foremost concerned with the way in
which law operates, is created and enforced in the global arena. And from
this perspective, then, we can begin to take into view the actually existing
forms of corporate regulation. In other words, a theory of norm creation in
the context of global market activities might not be found through a mere
extension or translation of nation-state-based doctrine onto a rudimentarily
defined sphere `beyond' or `outside' the nation state. What is needed,
instead, is a theory that allows for reflection on the manifold ways in which
norms have been emerging in the space between what we refer to as the
`domestic' on the one hand and the `global' on the other. As elaborated in
this paper, for a legal theory of global regulation, `space' is not meant to
depict a geographical realm, but instead a methodological one in which the
meanings ± and limitations ± of our distinction between the `national' and
the `global' can be addressed.
Such reflection must incorporate a high degree of empirical evidence of
existing forms of self-regulation such as codes of conduct,5 of best practices,
1 P. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2007, 2nd edn.); see,
previously, D.F. Vagts, `The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for
Transnational Law' (1969) 83 Harvard Law Rev. 739±92.
2 J. Ruggie, `Business and Human Rights: Further steps toward the operationalization
of the ``protect, respect and remedy'' framework'. Report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises A/HRC/14/27 (2010),
at <http://baseswiki.org/w/images/en/0/04/2010_Advance_Edited_Report.pdf>.
3 J.H. Dunning and S.M. Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy
(2008, 2nd edn.).
4 C. Scott, `Regulatory Governance and the Challenge of Constitutionalism' in The
Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications, eds. D. Oliver, T. Prosser, and R.
Rawlings (2010).
5 D. Vogel, `The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct' in The Politics of
Global Regulation, eds. W. Mattli and N. Woods (2009) 151±88.
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recommendations, and `social norms'6 or `governing contracts',7 but it must
do so against the background of a theoretical investigation into the concept
of law, which underlies and informs the almost habitual, routine distinction
between `law' on the one hand and these myriad `alternative forms of
regulation' on the other. The lawyer (as any other scientist) cannot simply
`go out and see', but must account for the conceptual bias with which this
confrontation with `reality' occurs. In this process, the study of the fastproliferating forms of public-private, hybrid norms that apply to market
activity turns into self-reflection on the theoretical starting points of the
larger legal theory from the vantage point at which this incorporation of
empirical evidence takes place.8 It is, thus, not simply an option to build a
theory on, say, the `fact' of ubiquitous forms of market self-regulation but,
instead, a necessary reflection on how one or more existing theories of how
legal norms are in fact incorporated into and account for this particular
empirical evidence.9
The core contention of this paper is that the challenging nature of the
regulation of global corporate conduct requires an adequately differentiated
approach towards the identification and analysis of the norms in question.
The central question is: `What is the concept of law that underlies the
regulation of global corporate conduct?' which I will try to answer by
proceeding in three steps. In part I, I briefly review the context of `state
intervention' and `market self-regulation', in which the current discussion of
regulatory responses to the economic/financial crisis and the role of selfregulation occurs before laying out the concept of `transnational legal
pluralism' in part II. In part III, I argue that an exemplary area such as
corporate governance can best be understood as an instance of transnational
legal pluralism, that is, as a field that becomes visible through a particular
methodological lens, which revisits the long-standing legal sociological
analysis of norm creation in the transnational arena. A brief introduction
follows into the place and relevance of corporate governance codes in the
present evolution of this regulatory area, emphasizing the particular nature
6 L. Bernstein, `Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry' (1992) 21 J. of Legal Studies 115±57.
7 See the contributions to the Symposium: `Governing Contracts: Public and Private
Perspectives' (2007) 14 Indiana J. of Global Legal Studies 183±483.
8 S. Macaulay, `Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts about
the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein' (2000) 94 Northwestern University
Law Rev. 775±804; V. Nourse and G. Shaffer, `Varieties of New Legal Realism:
Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?' (2009) 61 Cornell Law Rev.
61±137.
9 See, in this context, P. Zumbansen, `The Conundrum of Order: Governance from an
Interdisciplinary Perspective' in the Oxford Handbook of Governance, ed. D. LeviFaur (2011), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1671673>; P. Zumbansen, `The
Future of Legal Theory' (2010), contribution to the Hague Institute of the
Internationalisation of Law (HiiL) Project on `The Future of Law', at <http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1688455>.
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and dynamics of overlapping forms of state and non-state, hard and soft
regulation. The central insight from this section is concerned with refuting
the common view that transnational governance unfolds in considerable
distance from state-based law, making it an allegedly autonomous realm. In
fact, a close study of a new governance form such as corporate governance
codes written by mostly private, occasionally mixed, public-private expert
committees, reveals the `close ties' between state and market in initiating,
formulating, and implementing this type of regulation. In part IV, I conclude
by suggesting how the lessons of such a case study can contribute to an
ongoing theoretical investigation into the nature of global regulatory
governance, using the concept of `rough consensus and running code'.
I. MARKETS AND STATES AS REFERENCE POINTS IN THE
REGULATION DEBATE
The ongoing investigations among administrative and constitutional lawyers,
political scientists, sociologists, and regulatory theorists give ample evidence
of how the state has long become involved in complex collaborations,
delegations, trade-offs, and a myriad other divisions of labour with civil
society or `market' actors.10 At the same time, there is a rich repository of
studies related to the creation and nature of norms in the context of market
self-regulation, that point not to the end of the state but, rather, suggest a
highly complex relationship between state and non-state actors in the
production and administration of these norms.11 In light of this evidence, the
oft-painted picture of law's limits, or even exhaustion, under the impact of
globalization begins to fade. Instead of a futile struggle, where nation states
play a regulatory and policy catch-up game with de-territorialized corporate
and commercial actors or other amorphous crystallizations of globalization
forces, an image has long begun to form, which depicts a rising number of
actors with the capacity to expand on a vast territorial and operational
scale.12 Central to this depiction is an intricate overlapping of `hard' and
10 See, for example, M. Loughlin, `The Functionalist Style in Public Law' (2005) 55
University of Toronto Law J. 361±403.
11 L. Bernstein, `Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms' (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 1765±
821; G. Hadfield, `The Public and the Private in the Provision of Law for Global
Services' in Contractual Certainty in International Trade. Empirical Studies and
Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support for Global Economic Exchanges, ed.
V. Gessner (2009) 239±56; for a discussion, see, for example, G.-P. Calliess and P.
Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational
Private Law (2010) ch. 2.
12 See, for example, W. Mattli and N. Woods, `In Whose Benefit? Explaining
Regulatory Change in Global Politics' in The Politics of Global Regulation, eds. W.
Mattli and N. Woods (2009) 1±43; For earlier investigations, see the contributions
to A.C. Cutler, V. Haufler, and T. Porter, Private Authority and International
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`soft' norms, which are being produced by both state and non-state actors in
the regulation of these activities, an overlapping which in itself still remains
in need of much greater explanation as to the transition as well as the
relations and linkages between hard and soft norms. Overshadowing this
ongoing investigation are too often clicheÂ-like associations of hard norms
with the state, while soft norms are relegated to an allegedly separated, quasi
self-regulatory sphere of the market. Especially in times of perceived
`regulatory' and `market' failures'13 the strained nature of such categorizations becomes strikingly apparent, and our analysis is redirected to longstanding findings regarding the regulated and constituted nature of markets14
and to the long-grown web of institutions and practices of public-private
interaction between the state and the market.15 Thus, despite the exaggerated
news of its decline, the state continues to be deeply involved in the
production and administration of the norms that govern the global marketplace16, even if it is far from the sole author of governing regulations.17
This constellation invites analysis from a host of perspectives, and the
intriguing emphasis placed by legal scholars in the recent past on the
importance of `regulation' and `governance' is an important and crucial
element in this regard.18 It is becoming increasingly clear that a legal theory
of these forms of regulation `within' and `beyond' the nation state cannot be

13
14
15

16
17

18

Affairs (1999) and the important study by A.C. Cutler, Private Power and Global
Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Economy (2003).
See the astute observations by K.W. Dam, `The Subprime Crisis and Financial
Regulation: International and Comparative Perspectives' (2010) 10 Chicago J. of
International Law 581±638.
R.L. Hale, `Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State' (1923)
38 Political Science Q. 470±94; M.R. Cohen, `Property and Sovereignty' (1927) 13
Cornell Law Q. 8±30.
P.P. Craig, `Constitutions, Property and Regulation' (1991) Public Law 538±54,
reprinted in Regulation, ed. C. Scott (2003) 145±62; C. Harlow, `The ``Hidden
Paw'' of the State and the Publicisation of Private Law' in A Simple Common
Lawyer. Essays in Honour of Michael Taggart, eds. D. Dyzenhaus, M. Hunt, and G.
Huscroft (2009) 75±97.
See, for example, S. Sassen, `The State and Globalization' in Governance in a
Globalizing World, eds. J.S. Nye and J.D. Donahue (2000) 91.
K.W. Abbott and D. Snidal, `Strengthening International Regulation Through
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit' (2009) 42
Vanderbilt J. of Transnational Law 501±78; R.B. Hall and T.J. Biersteker, `The
Emergence of Private Authority in the International System' in The Emergence of
Private Authority in Global Governance, eds. R.B. Hall and T.J. Biersteker (2002)
3±20; Cutler, op. cit., n. 12.
See the introduction to this volume by C. Scott, F. Cafaggi, and L. Senden, pp. 1±19.
See, also, C. Scott, `Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Postregulatory State' in The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms
for the Age of Governance, eds. J. Jordan and D. Levi-Faur (2004) 145±74; B.
Morgan and K. Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation. Texts and Materials
(2007); F. Cafaggi, `New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation' in this
volume, pp. 20±49.
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adequately developed from within, but must instead take into account how
existing forms of regulation testify to an intricate overlap of different forms
and concepts of regulation. The impressive rise in importance of new
institutional economics in the idea of competition over a pervasive theory or
concept of `governance' is of eminent importance in this regard.19 As a
result, `economic governance'20 has developed into a sophisticated regulatory theory that must be taken seriously by anyone interested in the evolution
of regulatory governance ± which certainly should include lawyers.21 As this
short paper cannot do justice to the rich and wide-ranging exchanges
between lawyers and economists on the respective boundaries and overlaps
between their fields,22 it must suffice at this point to note that the general
contention regarding a choice between state `intervention' and `selfregulating markets' regularly renders invisible and de-politicizes the de
facto applied theories of political and legal order. Long before scholars (and
policy-makers) began recently to unveil the regulatory `reality' of what had
until now been portrayed as an overwhelming `retreat of the state' in the face
of economic and financial globalization over the past thirty years,23 there has
existed a great body of work addressing and describing the complex
regulatory constitution of market activity.24 Central to this line of argument
had always been a scrutiny of the role of legal rights in furnishing market
actors with legally sanctioned freedoms to engage in binding activities. In
other words, markets did not simply evolve according to `natural' laws, but
were instead subject to and the result of regulation, at the centre of which
existed a fragile if crucial tension between `negative' and `positive' rights.25
19 See D.C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(1990); O.E. Williamson, `The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock,
Looking Ahead' (2000) 38 J. of Economic Literature 595±613.
20 O.E. Williamson, `The Economics of Governance' (2005) 95 Am. Economic Rev.
1±18.
21 P. Zumbansen and G.P. Calliess, `Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory: State
of the Art and Interdisciplinary Perspectives' in Law, Economics and Evolutionary
Theory, eds. P. Zumbansen and G.P. Calliess (2011).)
22 For the area of corporate law, see, for example, G.K. Hadfield and E. Talley, `On
Public versus Private Provision of Corporate Law' (2006) 22 J. of Law, Economics
and Organization 414±41.
23 See D. Campbell, `The End of Posnerian Law and Economics' (2010) 73 Modern
Law Rev. 305±30; L.E. Mitchell, `Financialism ± A (Very) Brief History' in The
Embedded Firm: Corporate Governance, Labour and Financial Capitalism, eds.
C.A. Williams and P. Zumbansen (2011, forthcoming).
24 See the references in n. 14 above and see, further, B.H. Fried, The Progressive
Assault in Laissez Faire: Robert Hale and the First Law and Economics Movement
(1998).
25 R. WiethoÈlter, `Die Position des Wirtschaftsrechts im sozialen Rechtsstaat' in
Wirtschaftsordnung und Rechtsordnung, Festschrift fuÈr Franz BoÈhm zum 70.
Geburtstag, eds. H. Coing, H. Kronstein, and E.-J. MestmaÈcker (1965) 41±62; P.
Zumbansen, `Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic
Turn of Reflexive Law' (2008) 56 Am. J. of Comparative Law 769±805.
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The `mindset' described above regarding `free' markets and `enabling'
states26 provides a pertinent background and context for an analysis of a
form of regulation that has attained considerable prominence in recent
decades ± that of market self-regulation through `private' standard setting
and best practice `in the shadow', as it were, of an allegedly `formal'
framework, offering safeguards and an effective institutional foundation
associated with the state and its authority to make law. The following section
will illustrate the problematic consequences of such categorizations and
distinctions for an adequate understanding and theorizing of the widely
proliferating forms of transnational law making.
II. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PLURALISM: NEITHER NATIONAL
NOR INTERNATIONAL, NEITHER PUBLIC NOR PRIVATE
The following observations are limited to what can at best be a cursory study
of the institutional and conceptual dimensions of a particular form of market
regulation illustrated by the example of corporate governance codes. Such an
investigation offers a host of insights into the particular way in which market
regulation has been evolving in a framework that cannot be adequately
depicted as either national or international, public or private. Instead, the
particular relation between state and non-state actors in the initiation and
execution of the norm-creation process and the ensuing implementation,
dissemination, and administration of the norms in question defy categorization that would allow one neatly to assign authority for such a particular
regulatory regime to one side or the other. The chosen field, corporate
governance, is a case in point in the study of transnational law making, as I
will try to argue by scrutinizing both the underlying meaning of transnational
and the concept of law informing this approach. I will argue, that areas such
as corporate governance regulation must today be understood as instances of
`global assemblages',27 or, from a legal theoretical viewpoint, as examples
26 For a succinct analysis and critique, see S. Deakin, `Corporate Governance and
Financial Crisis in the Long Run' in Zumbansen and Williams, op. cit., n. 23. See,
also, K. Rittich, `Functionalism and Formalism: Their Latest Incarnations in
Contemporary Development and Governance Debates' (2005) 55 University of
Toronto Law J. 853±68.
27 For this concept, see S. Sassen, Territory ± Authority ± Rights. From Medieval to
Global Assemblages (2006). For earlier elaborations, see S. Sassen, The Global City
(1991); J. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents. Essays on the New Mobility of
People and Money (1998). See, also, M. Amstutz and V. Karavas, `Weltrecht: Ein
Derridasches Monster' in Soziologische Jurisprudenz. Liber Amicorum fuÈr Gunther
Teubner zum 65. Geburtstag, eds. G.-P. Calliess, A. Fischer-Lescano, D. Wielsch,
and P. Zumbansen (2009) 647±74; M. Amstutz, `MeÂtissage. Zur Rechtsform in der
Weltgesellschaft' in EuropaÈische Gesellschaftsverfassung. Zur Konstitutionalisierung sozialer Demokratie in Europa, eds. A. Fischer-Lescano, F. RoÈdl, and C.
Schmid (2009) 333±51.
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of transnational legal pluralism.28 As such, a regulatory field such as
corporate governance is, on the one hand, neither exclusively national
(domestic) nor international, while, on the other, this does not imply the
elimination or the overcoming of the nation state.29 In addition, such an area
cannot adequately be grasped through a separation of public and private as
long as that distinction seeks to demarcate two distinct and autonomous
norm-creating actors.30 Instead, the evolving regulatory regimes or,
`assemblages', as coined by Sassen, are constituted through persistent local
activity and interpretation, comprised of human, institutional, and technological elements, the latter resulting predominantly from the breathtaking
advances in information technology (`digitalizations').31 By comparison, as
will be laid out in more detail below, the concept of transnational legal
pluralism illustrates a continuing need for a specifically legal perspective on
the reconfiguration of an increasingly cross-jurisdictional, transnational
regulatory landscape. Such a perspective incorporates long-standing legal
sociological insights into pluralistic normative orders32 and a renewed
analysis of Polanyi's assessment of market dis/embeddedness.33
III. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
1. The transnational regulatory landscape

Corporate governance has to be seen in the context of a highly diversified
series of transnational norm-setting processes resulting in a veritable explosion of corporate governance codes in Europe and elsewhere. With the
proliferation of corporate governance codes, influenced and pushed by
international34 and transnational activities of norm setting, discussion, and
28 P. Zumbansen, ```New Governance'' in European Corporate Governance Regulation
as Transnational Legal Pluralism' (2008) 15 European Law J. 246±76, at <http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1128145>; P. Zumbansen, `Transnational Legal Pluralism' (2010)
1 Transnational Legal Theory 141±89, at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542907>.
29 Sassen, op. cit. (2006), n. 27, p. 325.
30 C. Harlow, ```Public'' and ``Private'' Law: Definition without Distinction' (1980) 43
Modern Law Rev. 241±65.
31 Sassen, op. cit. (2006), n. 27, p. 349 (noting the importance of focusing on financial
centres, not `markets', `as key nested communities enabling the construction and
functioning of such cultures of interpretation'.
32 E. Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (1913/1962); G.
Teubner, `The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism' (1992) 13 Cardozo
Law Rev. 1443±462.
33 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of our
Time (1944); J. Beckert, The Great Transformation of Embeddedness. Karl Polanyi
and the New Economic Sociology, Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of Societies,
Discussion Paper 07/1 (2007).
34 OECD; WCFCG; IVCGN.
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thought exchange,35 it has become increasingly difficult to identify a single
institution or author of a set of norms. Instead, much of the production and
dissemination of corporate governance rules operates through the migration
of standards36 and a cross-fertilization of norms. A distinct feature of this deterritorialized production of norms is the radical challenge these processes
pose for our understanding of what we call law proper. The dissemination of
corporate governance codes, disclosure standards and rules, best practices
and codes of conduct, affects the entire juridical `nexus of corporate governance' as comprised of norms pertaining to company law, labour law, and
securities regulation,37 as the decentralization of norm producers is repeated,
mirrored, and reflected in the hybridization of the norms themselves. It is in
this sense, that the study of the proliferation of corporate governance codes
and company law production in general, and of the rules of remuneration
disclosure in particular, feeds into a broader research inquiry into the
changing face of legal regulation in globally integrated marketplaces. A
more serious engagement between political economists and economic
sociologists on the one hand and corporate law scholars on the other about
the distinct institutions and dynamics of regulatory change, which constitute
the direly neglected groundwork, as it were, of what has for nearly two
decades now been discussed under the umbrella of the `convergence v.
divergence' of corporate governance standards,38 would complement and
challenge the apparently exclusionary choices between harmonization and
regulatory competition with a considerably deeper and more differentiated
assessment of present market-`disembeddedness'.39
Against this background, corporate governance emerges today as a telling
illustration of the fundamental transformations informing the regulatory
instruments and institutions of market governance. As corporate law is being
shaped by a complex mixture of public, private, state- and non-state-based
norms, principles, and rules which are generated, disseminated, and
monitored by a diverse set of actors, a closer look at this field can serve
35 ECGI, INSEAD, Euroshareholders.
36 See, for a comparable analysis of `migrating' human rights standards, C. Scott and
R. Wai, `Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct through the Migration of
Human Rights Norms: The Potential of Transnational ``Private'' Litigation' in
Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, eds. C. Joerges, I.-J. Sand, and G.
Teubner (2004) 287±319.
37 See J.W. Cioffi, Public Law and Private Power: Corporate Governance Reform in
the United States and Germany in an Age of Finance Capitalism (2010).
38 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, `Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law?' in
Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and Diversity, eds. J. A. McCahery,
P. Moerland, T. Raaijmakers, and L. Renneborg (2002) 56±82.
39 See, for example, S.M. Jacoby, `Corporate Governance in Comparative Perspective:
Prospects for Convergence' (2002) 22 Comparative Labor Law & Policy J. 5±32; C.
Crouch and W. Streeck, `Introduction: The Future of Capitalist Diversity' in
Political Economy of Modern Capitalism. Mapping Convergence and Diversity,
eds. C. Crouch and W. Streeck (1997) 1±18.
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two purposes, both of which this paper briefly addresses. One is the way in
which the analysis of contemporary corporate governance regulation can
help us to assess the emerging, new framework within which corporate
governance, but also other rules of market regulation, are evolving.
Secondly, through the way in which we begin to understand this emerging
transnational regulatory framework as an illustration of contemporary rulemaking in spatial regimes not confined to nation states' jurisdictional
boundaries, these regimes can be seen as new instantiations of the legal
pluralist order that legal sociologists have long been concerned with and in
the context of which they asked how `to investigate the correlations between
law and other spheres of culture'.40 On this basis, the transnational
emergence of regulatory regimes raises similar questions. The transnational
lens allows us to study such regimes not as being entirely detached from
national political and legal orders, but as emerging out of them, and reaching
beyond them. The transnational dimension of the new actors and the newly
emerging forms of norms radicalizes their `semi-autonomous' nature,
represented in the tension between a `formal' law and policy-making
apparatus on the one hand and spontaneously evolving `informal' norms in
particular social contexts on the other.41
2. Corporate governance codes
The development of corporate governance codes is thus an example of
intricate, domestic and transnational, multi-level processes of norm generation and norm enforcement. Starting from mere factual evidence, the
emergence of corporate governance codes in recent years has begun to alter
fundamentally the legal landscape of corporate law.42 Despite their
recognition as an essential element of corporate law,43 these codes constitute
a particular challenge to other, statutory approaches to law making, as they
are regularly drafted by non-state actors such as non-governmental associations, private industry institutes or corporate actors.44 In general, corporate
40 Ehrlich, op. cit., n. 32, pp. 486±506; see, also, G. Gurvitch, Sociology of Law
(1947); M. Rheinstein, `Review: Two Recent Books on Sociology of Law
[reviewing Timasheff's `Introduction' and Gurvitch's `Elements']' (1941) 51 Ethics
220±31, at 221±2.
41 S.F. Moore, `Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate
subject of study' (1973) 7 Law & Society Rev. 719±46.
42 For an overview of existing corporate governance codes in various countries, see
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php>.
43 See M. Eisenberg, `The Architecture of American Corporate Law: Facilitation and
Regulation' (2005) 2 Berkeley Business Law J. 167±84, at 176, 182.
44 For one of the first examples, the German Corporate Governance Code, see the
interview with Professor Theodor Baums, who chaired the commission that
preceded the drafting commission: T. Baums, `Interview: Reforming German
Corporate Governance: Inside a Law Making Process of a Very New Nature' (2001)
2 German Law J., at <http://www.germanlawJ..com/past_issues.php?id=43>.
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governance codes are relatively short collections of, on the one hand, legal
regulations that are already in force in a particular jurisdiction, and
recommendations and suggestions, directed either to private corporations or,
in some cases,45 the law maker, concerning a company's organization, its
governance rules and disclosure regime not included in statutory law, on the
other.46 In the case of the German Corporate Governance Code, for example,
recommendations are marked by the word `shall'. While companies are free
to deviate from them, they are under an obligation to disclose this deviation.47 By contrast, suggestions can be deviated from without disclosure.48
We shall see below how the German legislator has chosen to transpose this
disclosure obligation into statutory law. These hybrid norms of corporate
regulation,49 which are neither exclusively public nor private, pose a
formidable challenge to traditional thinking about law-making authority,
non-legal rules, and their enforcement.
Corporate governance relates to the exercise of powers inside the firm: the
analytical focus can, for one, be directed to the relationship between the
owner (shareholder; principal) and the management (agent). Alternatively,
one may focus on the overall organizational structure of the firm. While this
also includes the principal-agent ties, it also encompasses the other `stakeholders' in the firm, such as employees and creditors. The first, controloriented approach centres on shareholders as the prime residual claimants of
the firm: therefore, the firm's organization is governed by the overriding
principle of maximizing `shareholder value'.50 The other, stakeholderoriented, approach considers the actors in and around the firm and its
business with regard to their vested interests in the firm. It sees the firm as

45 See U. Noack and D. Zetzsche, `Corporate Governance Reform in Germany: The
Second Decade', CBCWP No. 0010 (2005) 6±7, at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=646761>.
46 C. Mallin, Corporate Governance (2005) 19±40; J. Hill, `Regulatory Responses to
Global Corporate Scandals' (2005) 23 Wisconsin International Law J. 367±416, at
376 (highlighting how CGC have tended to be either a response to the absence of
governmental regulation or a justification of such absence); Eisenberg, op. cit., n.
43, p. 182: `bodies of standards, principles, or rules that are promulgated by private
institutions, and that have force of some sort although they are not directly backed
by state sanctions'.
47 `Preface', German Corporate Governance Code (2002) 2, at: <www.bmj.bund.de/
enid/Corporate_Governance/German_Corporate_Governance_Code_1gj.html>.
48 id.
49 R.C. Nolan, `The Legal Control of Directors' Conflicts of Interest in the United
Kingdom: Non-Executive Directors Following the Higgs Report' (2005) 6
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 413±62, at 418: `complex mixtures of private and
public action'; R. Mitchell, A. O'Donnell, and I. Ramsay, `Shareholder Value and
Employee Interests: Intersections between Corporate Governance, Corporate Law
and Labor Law' (2005) 23 Wisconsin International Law J. 417±75, at 451 (clearly
distinguishing CGC from law as ```self-regulation'' or ``soft law'' provisions').
50 M.C. Jensen, A Theory of the Firm. Governance, Residual Claims, and
Organizational Forms (2000).
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embedded in a specific legal, economic and political culture, herein playing a
role as societal actor.51 In contrast to the shareholder approach, this
perspective takes into account the public services rendered by a large firm in
view of employment capacities and overall socio-economic spin-off.52
These two definitions lie at the base of a debate over different patterns of
corporate organization, which was for the longest time driven by an almost
overwhelming belief in what some recognized as nothing less than the `end
of history in corporate law',53 namely, the eventual triumph of the shareholder value theory. The present crisis appears to have seriously undermined
this credo. However, it is important to emphasize that what might have been
perceived as a dispute merely among corporate law scholars (and policy
makers) had instead long become a forum of much wider impact, as
participants acknowledged the exemplary role of corporate governance for a
timely and much needed scrutiny and critique of market regulation.54
Corporate governance codes such as those developed in countries around
the world illuminate the significant characteristics of law-making processes
that have been undergoing dramatic changes with regard to the actors
involved and the nature of the norms generated in these processes. These
developments have to be placed in the wider context of law-making reform.
In this respect, reform does not concern only company law but, more
generally, involves national, European, and international attempts to
improve law-making procedures by allowing for a wider inclusion of private
actors in rule-making procedures.55 What is involved, from the point of view
of democratic theory, is a tension that has long been growing between a
functionally reduced, rubber-stamping parliament on the one hand and a fastmoving, hardly controllable administration which is in close contact and
interaction with private actors, on the other.56 At the same time, the currently
51 J. Parkinson, `Models of the Company and the Employment Relationship' (2003) 41
British J. of Industrial Relations 481±509.
52 S. Jacoby, `Corporate Governance and Society' (2005) 48 Challenge 69±87.
53 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, `The End of History for Corporate Law' (2001) 89
Georgetown Law J. 439±68.
54 See, for example, P.A. Gourevitch and J. Shinn, Political Power and Corporate
Control. The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance (2005); P.A. Hall and
D. Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative
Advantage (2001).
55 See, for example, for the current endeavours on the European level, K.A. Armstrong,
`Civil Society and the White Paper ± Bridging or Jumping the Gaps?' in Mountain or
Molehill? A Critical Appraisal on the Commission White Paper on Governance, eds.
C. Joerges, Y. Meny, and J.H.H. Weiler, Harvard Law School Jean Monnet Working
Paper No.6/01 (2001) 95±102, 99±100: `The normative case for a more autonomised
transnational civil society [. . .] lies in the inclusion of a new constituency of voices,
interests and expertise within eÂlite transnational governance.'
56 For a powerful reconstruction of the pertinent role of the administration in designing
rules `close to the ground', see the landmark assessment by J.W. Landis, The
Administrative Process (1938).
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widespread attempts at improving respective national laws on corporate
governance and firm organization57 must be seen against the background of
what was until just a couple of years ago an overwhelming pressure for
international convergence towards a set of corporate governance principles,
most notably established in the United States and the United Kingdom,58 an
effort that was for years informed by a sense of urgency with regard to
adapting stakeholder-oriented, close-knit, bank-financed corporate
governance systems to an extremely volatile competition for globally
available investments. This understanding is currently, at the time of writing,
shaped anew by widespread concerns with the consequences and
externalities of the finance capitalism of the last twenty years.59
These developments can no longer solely be studied within contained,
embedded systems of national political economies. Instead, there is a
growing awareness of the fact that the adaptations of historically evolved
governance systems display a particular transnational dimension. In light of
the globally intertwined business and interaction among firms created under
different legal rules, corporate governance rules have increasingly become a
competitive asset in a `law market',60 a market, however, that is not only
constituted by sovereign sellers with vested authority in the creation of
binding legal norms, but by an amalgamation of national governments and
through supranational norm setting such as by the OECD or in form of the
UN Global Compact, by private parties such as multinational corporations
and interest group representations. This particularly global regulatory
landscape has not failed to capture the imagination of scholars of comparative law,61 regulatory theory,62 and institutional analysis.63 The corporate
governance landscape is not only populated by national governments eagerly
engaged in a headstrong pursuit of regulatory reform: complementing such
efforts is a vast proliferation of private and mixed public/private, hybrid
processes of rule making, cutting across jurisdictional boundaries and con57 See the contributions in K.J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch, Comparative Corporate
Governance ± Essays and Materials (1997); T. Baums, introduction to Bericht der
Regierungskommission Corporate Governance. UnternehmensfuÈ hrung,
Unternehmenskontrolle, Modernisierung des Aktienrechts (2001).
58 See H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, `The End of History for Corporate Law'
(2001) 89 Georgetown Law J. 439±68; critically, D.M. Branson, `The Very
Uncertain Prospect of ``Global'' Convergence in Corporate Governance' (2001) 34
Cornell International Law J. 321±62.
59 See Deakin, op. cit., n. 26.
60 E.A. O'Hara and L.E. Ribstein, The Law Market (2009).
61 J. Hill, `Regulatory Show and Tell: Lessons from International Statutory Regimes'
(2008) 33 Delaware J. of Corporate Law 819±43.
62 J. Black and D. Rouch, `The development of global markets as rule-makers:
engagement and legitimacy' (2008) Law and Financial Markets Rev. 218±33.
63 See, for example, the recent monograph study by A. Busch, Banking Regulation and
Globalization (2009) with case studies on the United States, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and Switzerland.
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tributing to an increasingly densely woven net of guidelines, best practices,
and standards. The defining feature of the emerging transnational body of
corporate governance norms is the intricate resurfacing of a series of paradoxes pertaining to the inseparability of substantive/procedural,
coordinative/regulatory and authority/affectedness aspects of the norms in
question.64 In order to illustrate the theoretical challenge facing any legal
theory that wishes to explain the norm creation dynamics in this area, our
analysis cannot be confined to the substantive law governing specific forms
of societal activity, which has long remained the hallmark of comparative
work in the law of corporate governance;65 rather, our attention has to turn as
well to the dynamics that are unfolding between different levels and sites of
rule making from a regulatory perspective. From this combined perspective,
the law of corporate governance becomes a prime example of a transnational
law regime. The intricate embeddedness of regulatory innovation in locally
defined governance structures on the one hand, and their integration in
transnationally unfolding rule-making processes is characteristic of the
current regulatory landscape in corporate governance, as illustrated by the
particular dynamics of corporate governance codes. From this perspective,
codes are a powerful example of the way in which private ordering maintains
an intricately challenging tension with the institutional frameworks for
official law making.
3. Hybrid law making: the example of the German Corporate Governance
Code
For an adequate understanding of the drafting of the German Corporate
Governance Code as an illustration of transnational regulatory processes, it is
important to acknowledge the particular interplay between `hard' and `soft'
law in this fast-moving regulatory area against the background of the global
convergence debate regarding corporate governance standards. The `hard'
law, that is of eminent interest in this context, is a 2002 Act which had prior
to that passed the national parliament (Bundestag), and which introduced a
number of substantial changes to the German Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act).66 This particular statute had to a large degree been contemplated
64 For a detailed discussion, see G. Hadfield, `The Public and the Private in the
Provision of Law for Global Services' in Gessner, op. cit., n. 11, pp. 239±56;
Calliess and Zumbansen, op. cit., n. 11, ch. 2.
65 See the excellent study by D. Vagts, `Reforming the ``Modern Corporation'':
Perspectives from the German' (1966) 80 Harvard Law Rev. 23±89.
66 See Gesetz zur weiteren Reform des Aktien- und Bilanzrechts, zu Transparenz und
PublizitaÈt (Transparenz- und PublizitaÈtsgesetz ± abbr. TraPuG) [Transparency and
Disclosure Act], adopted by the German Bundestag on 17 May 2002. See, also, the
documentation in (2002) Neue Zeitschrift fuÈr Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 78±81, and
the comprehensive presentation of the TraPuG's main elements by H. Hirte, Das
Transparenz- und PublizitaÈtsgesetz (2003).
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and prepared under the auspices of two specially formed governmental
commissions concerned with a reform of German corporate governance. The
second of these commissions, the so-called `Corporate Governance CodeCommission', had been convened with the mandate of taking up the
suggestions of the first commission, central to which was the drafting of a
voluntary Code of Corporate Governance Rules.67 Among the many
interesting features of the German Corporate Governance Code, by some
seen as a `novum' in the system of German legal sources68, was an initially
vivid but meanwhile relatively subsided debate regarding the Code's legal
nature.69
The Code itself includes those norms and regulations that are mandatory
corporate law rules which are already set out in the German Stock Corporation Law. The Code's purpose, according to its drafters, in reiterating these
norms here is to provide foreign investors with a transparent and simple
introduction to central rules pertinent to the corporate governance rules
existing in Germany.70 Furthermore, the Code includes recommendations,
which are expressed by the word `sollen' (shall) and the observation of
which is to be made transparent in an annual statement by the firm's
management.71 Lastly, the Code contains suggestions as to corporate
conduct, the observation of which is merely `suggested', but there is no
obligation to disclose whether a company has followed these suggestions.72
The `comply or disclose' principle which is endorsed in the Code with regard
to `recommendations' has been seen as an indirect enforceability anchor in
the Code, whereby it could be seen to lose its genuinely voluntary

67 See press release at: <http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/news/presse20020226.html>.
68 P. Ulmer, `Der deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex ± ein neues Regulierungsinstrument fuÈr boÈrsennotierte Aktiengesellschaften' (2002) 166 ZHR 150±81, at
152.
69 E. Vetter, `Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex nur ein zahnloser Tiger? Zur
Bedeutung von § 161 AktG fuÈr BeschluÈsse der Hauptversammlung' (2008) Neue
Zeitschrift fuÈr Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 121±5, at 121: still not resolved
satisfactorily.
70 Foreword, German Corporate Governance Code, at <http://www.corporategovernance-code.de/eng/kodex/1.html>:
This German Corporate Governance Code (the `Code') presents essential
statutory regulations for the management and supervision (governance) of
German listed companies and contains internationally and nationally recognized
standards for good and responsible governance. The Code aims at making the
German Corporate Governance system transparent and understandable. Its
purpose is to promote the trust of international and national investors, customers,
employees and the general public in the management and supervision of listed
German stock corporations.
71 See Preface, German Corporate Governance Code 2, at <http://www.corporategovernance-code.de/index-e.html>.
72 id.
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character.73 That the Code in fact attains an at least indirect mandatory
character, is strengthened by the enactment of a provision in the German
Stock Corporation Act (AktG), whereby the disclosure duty is codified into
law.74 But does this suffice to make the Code a piece of enforceable
legislation? Others have argued that, even if there is a disclosure obligation
with regard to the company's compliance with the Code's recommendations,
it would be wrong to perceive the Code itself as `law'. The latter, so it was
argued,75 would only then be the case if the recommendations themselves
were being made obligatory which, arguably, they are not.76 It appears that
the Code's practical relevance is to be seen in its effect on the actual
behaviour of firms,77 something which appears to have continuously accrued
with each passing year.78 Whether or not firms do comply with the code's
dispositions relating, for example, to transparency and disclosure of
executive compensation79 (a part of the Kodex that spurred concrete
legislative action leading up to the entering into force of a federal statute on
the adequacy of executive compensation in August 200980), the publication

73 W. Seidel, `Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex ± eine private oder doch
eine staatliche Regelung?' (2004) 25 Zeitschrift fuÈr Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 285±94;
W. Seidel, `Kodex ohne Rechtsgrundlage' (2004) Neue Zeitschrift fuÈ r
Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 1095±6; M. Heintzen, `Der Deutsche Corporate
Governance Kodex aus der Sicht des deutschen Verfassungsrechts' (2004) 25
Zeitschrift fuÈr Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 1933±8.
74 The quality and assessment of this obligatory annual `explanation' must certainly be
disputed, see, for example, M. Peltzer, `Handlungsbedarf in Sachen Corporate
Governance' (2002) Neue Zeitschrift fuÈr Gesellschaftsrecht [NZG] 593±9, at 594;
regrettably, the newly published, leading commentary on German stock corporation
law remains silent on this new codification, see U. HuÈffer, Aktiengesetz (2002)
s. 161 AktG.
75 H.-M. Ringleb, Introduction to Kommentar zum Deutschen Corporate Governance
Kodex [Kodex-Kommentar], eds. H.-M. Ringleb, T. Kremer, M. Lutter, and A. von
Werder (2008, 3rd edn.); A. von Werder, `Der Deutsche Corporate GovernanceKodex ± Grundlagen und Einzelbestimmungen' (2002) 55 Der Betrieb 801±10;
C.H. Seibt, `Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex und EntsprechenserklaÈrung
(s. 161 AktG-E)' (2002) 47 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 249±59.
76 M. Lutter, `Die Kontrolle der gesellschaftsrechtlichen Organe: Corporate Governance ± ein internationales Thema' (2002) 24 Jura 83±8, 86, with regard to
informations and suggestions.
77 C.H. Seibt, `Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex: Antworten auf Zweifelsfragen der Praxis' (2003) 48 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 465±77.
78 J. van Kann and M. Eigler, `Aktuelle Neuerungen des Corporate Governance
Kodex' (2007) Deutsche Zeitschrift fuÈr Steuerrecht 1730±6, at 1733.
79 M. Wolf, `Corporate Governance. Der Import angelsaÈchsicher ``Self-Regulation''
im Widerstreit zum deutschen Parlamentsvorbehalt' (2002) 35 Zeitschrift fuÈr
Rechtspolitik (ZRP) 59±60, at 60.
80 See Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der VorstandsverguÈtung ± VorstAG; full text at:
<http://www.bmj.de/files/7db813ef5ce3522d02ef3547a4c2f341/3836/gesetz_
vorstandsverguetung_VorstAG.pdf>.
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of the firm's reports on the Internet,81 or the facilitating of personal exercise
of shareholders' voting rights82 will, according to the rules established by the
Code, remain within the discretion of the company.83 Again, the Code
explicitly foresees that companies do not have to comply with
`recommendations'. And yet they are now obliged to issue an annual
explanation, regardless of whether or not they did comply.84 The annual
monitoring of the Code's `acceptance' has revealed consistently growing
numbers of German major corporations observing the Code.85
Much suggests, however, that this perspective on `hard' versus `soft' law
is inadequate to capture the particular combination of coordinative/
regulatory dimensions reflected in the Code. The preceding discussion
highlights how our conceptualization of the enforcement qualities of the
Corporate Governance Code is informed by our understanding of the
distinction between a statutory norm of law set by the state, on the one hand,
and a non-binding norm of non-law on the other. This distinction, however,
is a result of a continuing association of law-making power with state organs,
long after the generation of norms has become characterized by a complex
interplay between public and private actors ± as illustrated in the case of the
German Code.
Questions of authorship and legitimacy in the area of law making become
elusive in light of the fact that the state is highly dependent on expert input
from societal actors in carrying out its legislative and administrative functions.86 Furthermore, it is clear that with the growing complexity of societal
relations and, correspondingly, a growing demand for sophisticated and
context-sensitive public governance forms,87 any form of norm-production
and implementation has become an extremely fragile process of risk taking
and of trial and error. In the light of the particular governance challenges
arising in modern societies,88 an allegedly clear-cut distinction between
81 See, for example, s. 2.3.1 of the Cromme commission's German Corporate
Governance Code.
82 id., s. 2.3.3.
83 id., s. 1: `Foreword', differentiating between voluntary recommendations (`shall'),
suggestions (`should', `can'), and legally compelling provisions, according to
existing law.
84 See Transparency and Disclosure Act, s. 16.
85 Van Kann and Eigler, op. cit., n. 78, p. 1733.
86 See R.B. Stewart, `The Reformation of American Administrative Law' (1975) 88
Harvard Law Rev. 1669; J. Freeman, `Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State' (1997) 45 UCLA Law Rev. 1±98.
87 G. Teubner, `Juridification ± Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions' in Juridification
of Social Spheres, ed. G. Teubner (1987) 3±48; K.-H. Ladeur, The Theory of
Autopoiesis as an Approach to a Better Understanding of Postmodern Law, EUI
Working Paper (1999).
88 See U. Beck, `From Industrial Society to Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social
Structure and Ecological Enlightenment' (1992) 9 Theory, Culture & Society 97±
123.
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public and private governance schemes, built on the image of a sovereign,
knowledgable state presiding over a fragmented market society, would fail to
grasp the intricate forms of intertwined public-private governance
mechanisms, of knowledge sharing and experimental politics that
characterize contemporary law making.89
The discussion of the rise of governance in contemporary law making
reflects a wide-ranging interest, but also a high level of concern with what is
being perceived as a `privatization of law'.90 As Colin Scott noted:
. . . recognition of private legislation reflects both a desire to better understand
the diffuse nature of capacities underpinning regulatory and wider governance
practices and a concern respecting the legitimacy of such non-governmental
rule making.91

This combination of `desire' and `concern' originates from a persisting
association of law and its creation with the (public) state sphere, while
informal and private ordering remains relegated to the (private) market
realm. Central to our analysis up to this point was an argument against this
dualistic distinction, which is inadequate to grasp the ways in which both
hybrid and private forms of norm generation can produce norms with
regulatory functions. In concluding this section on corporate governance
codes, it is time to draw out the context in which this hybrid law making
occurs, a context which is both `real', that is, consisting of actors, and
conceptual, meaning that it is, at the same time, a particular, methdological
reflection on the way that norms are being created in such areas today.
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE INTRICACIES OF ROUGH
CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE
The example of the German Corporate Governance Code can be taken to
illustrate a theoretical concept, which Gralf Calliess and I, drawing on
previous work in Internet governance92 have been developing further as
Rough Consensus and Running Code [RCRC],93 in the following way. The
German government, facing immense domestic and international pressure to
89 See, for example, M. Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (1997); M.
Power, `Enterprise Risk Management and the Organization of Uncertainty in
Financial Institutions' in The Sociology of Financial Markets, eds. K.K. Cetina and
A. Preda (2005) 250±68.
90 See the survey by J. KoÈndgen, `Privatisierung des Rechts. Private Governance
zwischen Deregulierung und Rekonstitutionalisierung' (2006) 206 Archiv fuÈr die
cilivilistische Praxis [AcP] 477±525.
91 C. Scott, `Regulating private legislation' in Making European Law: Governance
Design, eds. F. Cafaggi and H. Muir-Watt (2008) 254±86, at 254.
92 A.L. Russell, ```Rough Consensus and Running Code'' and the Internet-OSI
Standards War' (2006) 28 IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 48±61.
93 Calliess and Zumbansen, op. cit., n. 11.
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reform its corporate law regime so as to make German companies more
attractive for global investors, was aware of the reform obstacles existing in
the contemporary German political economy. At the same time, the government considered the potential of societal (`market') self-regulation, as
highlighted by the Ministry of Justice. Furthermore, the German government
was hardly taking a revolutionary step when inviting a Commission to draft
this instrument. Even if the legislative project of drafting a national civil
code in the latter part of the nineteenth century was, of course, in many ways
different from the drafting of the Corporate Governance Code in 2002, the
SchroÈder government's initiation of the Commission, which was markedly
referred to as a `Government Commission', also bears some important
resemblances to its historical forerunner. In both instances, the government
drew on private expert knowledge in preparing a comprehensive legislative
instrument, the regulatory impact of which was perceived as being so large
that its delegation to a commission of experts promised to channel otherwise
conflicting and perhaps irresolvable positions through a discursive, outcomeoriented process. Certainly, the government's initiation of this normgeneration process remained ambivalent at best with regard to the legal
nature of the Code growing out of the commission's work. The striking
characteristic of both the process of the Code's drafting and of the Code
itself remains, it seems, its hybrid nature between a non-binding, voluntary,
`private' regulatory instrument on the one hand and a document, linked to a
statutory disclosure obligation by a federal law, on the other. Yet, neither
dimension adequately depicts the dynamics that shape the emergence of the
idea of a Code, the evolution of its drafting, and the intriguingly open-ended
nature of the discussion around the legal nature of both the norms of the
Code as of the Code itself. Instead, the discussion has made it clear that the
repeated attempts to solve this dilemma by effectively avoiding the `public'
or `private' question through designating the Code as hybrid, and by
referring to its norms as `soft law', achieves just that, namely, avoiding the
underlying conundrum of how to integrate such governance processes into
our legal theoretical methodology and doctrine. This, then, makes the
example of the German Code particularly intriguing because its coming into
being is reflective of both its embeddedness in a complex, historically
evolved political economy that was historically sceptical with regard to
private law making and market ordering,94 and of a fast-evolving transnational regulatory landscape in which public and private actors ± as `norm
entrepreneurs' ± not only compete in striving to make `better rules' but in a
much richer fashion overlap, intertwine, collaborate, and antagonize, and
94 See H. Groûmann-Doerth, `Selbstgeschaffenes Recht der Wirtschaft und staatliches
Recht [1933]' in Das selbstgeschaffene Recht der Wirtschaft. Zum Gedenken an
Hans Groûmann-Doerth (1894±1944), eds. U. Blaurock, N. Goldschmidt, and A.
Hollerbach (2005) 77±96; D. Hart, `Zur konzeptionellen Entwicklung des
Vertragsrechts' (1984) 29 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 66±80.

68
ß 2011 The Author. Journal of Law and Society ß 2011 Cardiff University Law School

thereby contribute to a constantly changing space that Saskia Sassen has
referred to as both institutional and normative.
The concept of Rough Consensus and Running Code combines a
deliberative perspective with an experimental, law-making one. Drawing on
expert and stakeholder knowledge, the regulating body, which can be public,
private or hybrid, will seek to identify an evolving ± rough ± consensus in
light of which it will put forward an experimental draft body of norms.
These, in turn, will receive feedback and remain open to adaptation and
change, constituting a running code. RCRC seeks to capture the particular
tension between multipolar, formal/informal processes of deliberation and
consensus-seeking, on the one hand, and the emergence of regulatory
instruments with experimental and adaptable character on the other. Central
to this approach is the emphasis on the inseparability of elementary features
in theories of social order, which are traditionally defined through
distinctions. Examples include, foremost, the distinction between public
and private or between state and market, but also ± as regards the `function'
of a norm ± the distinction between coordination and regulation.95 The
RCRC model seeks to capture the particular tension inherent to normgenerating processes where the nature of the particular issue does not easily
lend itself to an association with only one of these elements. The evolving
norms and the processes of their generation in sensitive regulatory areas defy
a categorization of either public or private, coordinative or regulative. As a
result, their classification as either `law' or `non-law' depending on their
origin in a recognized, competent law-making authority is as problematic as
is the declaration that a norm constitutes a merely `private' arrangement or,
`social norm'. RCRC, thus, problematizes the tension between the definition
of a norm's legitimacy as law or non-law with reference to whether or not it
emanated from an `official' law-making authority, on the one hand, and as to
whether the legitimacy of norms should be measured in light of the input into
their creation by those `affected' by the norm, on the other. As we have tried
to show with regard to the fast-evolving regulatory fields of transnational
contract and corporate law, the particular dynamics of norm creation in
sensitive societal areas characterized by a hybrid combination of official and
unofficial actors and a high degree of experimental, tentative, reflexive
regulation, suggest the impossibility of associating such processes with only
one of the identified sides.
From this perspective, the transnational regulatory landscape of corporate
governance is marked by the intricate collision of public, private, and hybrid
ceaselessly evolving norm-making processes that arise between regulatory
arenas populated by actors inside and outside of the nation state. These
norm-making processes are complex in the sense that the identification of
95 See G. Hadfield, `The Public and the Private in the Provision of Law for Global
Services' in Gessner, op. cit., n. 11, pp. 239±56.
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either coordinative (facilitating) or regulatory (redistributing) functions can
no longer occur on the basis of distinguishing between the public or private
nature of the actors involved.96 Instead, the norm-making processes have to
be seen as law generating when and where we are willing to recognize the
inseparability of the coordinative/regulatory dimension from the authority/
affectedness dimension of these processes. This connection distances the
RCRC process from a new institutional economic assessment of formal/
informal rule creation and ties it into a comprehensive and interdisciplinary
investigation into the foundations and processes of global law making as
currently pursued by sociologists, political scientists, and philosophers as
well as legal pluralist scholars.
Against this background, what can be learned from this example for other
contemporary forms of law making? Recognizing a growing interest among
legal scholars in the origins and prospects of what is conventionally referred
to as a `privatization of law',97 it is necessary to emphasize that the
regulatory function of the Code does not follow from the state's enactment
of a statutory disclosure obligation, as was repeatedly argued by those
identifying the Code as a public regulatory instrument. What constitutes an
unsatisfactory answer to the question whether or not the Code is law resulted
from the recognition that, in fact, not only the underlying drafting process
but also the envisioned enforcement mechanism are intriguingly complex
and arguably open-ended for a reason. The government did not make the
Code directly or indirectly enforceable when it enacted the disclosure
requirement, as it did not itself enact an ultimately effective sanctioning
mechanism in the case of non-disclosure or deficient disclosure. Instead, the
government's action in this regard illustrates a particular set of features that
characterize law making in the area of corporate governance and many other
regulatory areas today. The Code can only fulfil its function of influencing
corporate behaviour and, as such, rendering German corporations more
competitive, if a sufficient number of market participants endorse the Code's
rules to make them matter. In that sense, a rough consensus regarding the
Code's normative obligations must exist for it to have any influence on the
corporate landscape. This rough consensus must not encompass each and
every of the Code's recommendations or, perhaps even less, its suggestions.
Instead, it suffices that there is among market participants a far-reaching
agreement ± a rough consensus ± as to the binding quality of the Code's
content. That this is the case has been verified by a number of empirical
studies since its publication.98 Secondly, the particular quality of the Code's
96 But see Hadfield, id. and Hadfield and Talley, op. cit., n. 22.
97 J. KoÈ ndgen, `Privatisierung des Rechts. Private Governance zwischen
Deregulierung und Rekonstitutionalisierung' (2006) 206 Archiv fuÈr die cilivilistische
Praxis [AcP] 477±525; G. Borges, `Selbstregulierung im Gesellschaftsrecht ± zur
Bindung an Corporate Governance-Kodices' (2003) 32 ZGR 508±40.
98 Van Kann and Eigler, op. cit., n. 78.
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three-pronged regulatory nature of information (restatements), recommendations, and suggestions in connection with the statutory disclosure
requirements for recommendations leads to a complex constellation of the
Code's regulatory impact. Where a rough consensus is being attained, it
might set into motion the generation and crystallization of a customary law
of corporate governance norms, namely, with the passage of time and an
increasing acceptance of the Code among market participants. With the
crystallization of certain corporate governance rules, parts of the law of
corporate governance can develop into a regime which can further develop
and solidify in the future. In light of such an incremental growth of norms
through piloting (drafting a code), implementing (publishing it), and
enforcing them (through a communication obligation set by the state on
the one hand, and a market shaming process on the other), the Code can
contribute to the growth of a corporate governance regime, which can
become ever more comprehensive, while at the same time being more
flexible, open, and adaptive to changes than a statutory provision would be.
Seen in this light, the Code is illustrative of how recommendations can be
made to enter a regulatory realm which is occupied by both public and
private norm-entrepreneurs, including the state that is pursuing corporate law
reform, and private actors such as banks, investments funds, and expert
groups calling for new rules to govern corporate conduct but also other
stakeholders such as unions and business ethics propagators. From this
perspective, the Code denotes how recommendations can increasingly be
recognized as `rules to be followed', long before they may grow into widely
accepted norms of `good governance'. That the latter is not oriented towards
a reductionist concept of market efficiency is maintained by connecting the
coordinative/regulatory dimension with that of authority/affectedness. It is
against this background, then, that we need not only to return to the original
question of whether the Code is law, but also dare to inquire whether we
have been asking the right question.
As suggested, the perspective taken vis-aÁ-vis reform issues related to
corporate governance has been informed by both a public-private, officialnon-official distinction between law and non-law, on the one hand, and a
deeply felt scepticism about the chances for the law reform of historically
grown, path-dependent norms and institutions, not only in `Germany
Incorporated',99 on the other. And, indeed, the legacies with which we have
been struggling, are weighty. In contrast to the institutional and methodological side of norm setting and law making in the context of increasingly
`privatized' law-making forms, most contemporary commentators of
corporate law reform have not yet begun to embrace such a perspective. As
it stands, law reform continues to be conceptualized largely with regard to a
99 P.A. Hall and D. Soskice, `An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism' in Hall and
Soskice, op. cit., n. 54, pp. 1±68.
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dualistic perception of state regulation and `intervention' on the one hand and
market order and self-regulation on the other. Traditionally, the German
choice was thus: `To regulate or not to regulate'. And, the traditional answer
was, indeed, to regulate.100 The realm of options for the protection of
shareholders' interests have thus been perceived to range from coercive,
binding law (`vested rights') to an approach of entrusting this protection to the
capital market.
But it is against this background that ± on both sides of the Atlantic, and
beyond ± the search for `good governance' in company law will continue. It
will do so by involving the wide range of public, private, and hybrid lawmaking forms to which we have increasingly grown accustomed. For this,
valuable lessons can be drawn from earlier examples of commercial selfregulation (for example, standard contracts), as well as from other,
contemporary developments in other fields (environmental law, commercial
arbitration101). The rich spectrum of experiences on the national, European,
and international level is reflective of an on-going search for ways to
adequately mobilize societal knowledge while being aware and conscious of
divergent national trajectories of socio-legal and economic development.
The enactment of the Corporate Governance Code and the installation and,
indeed, highly effective continuation of a `standing commission' to review
its acceptance and the need of amendments are both illustrations of a change
in approaching law reform in a politically highly contested area. At the same
time, the development of codes, in Germany as in many other countries, by
private and public actors, both domestically and transnationally, suggests the
emergence of legal regimes that can no longer adequately be explained with
reference to the `state' or the `market'. Instead, the emergence of a
transnational law of corporate governance is characterized by an intricate
combination of public and private agency, but also of a variety of regulatory,
evolving instruments.
As corporate governance scholars continue to sharpen their analytical
lenses for the study of formal/informal norm creation and the particular
socio-economic cultures102 in which different hybrid regulatory approaches
100 See the brillant account by G. Spindler, `Deregulierung des Aktienrechts?' (1998)
43 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 53±74, 53 ff., 57, stressing the different approach
taken by American corporate law, which ± for the most part ± is state law, which is,
in turn, `enabling' law, giving firms great discretion in designing their governing
law. `Corporate law' as such, then, serves for one as a framework providing default
rules, while, on federal level, it contains a considerable number of binding rules to
safeguard investors' interest and trust in the capital market.
101 See, for example, F. De Ly, `Lex Mercatoria (New Law Merchant): Globalisation
and International Self-Regulation' in Rules and Networks. The Legal Culture of
Global Business Transactions, eds. V. Gessner, R.P. Appelbaum, and W.F. Felstiner
(2001) 159±88.
102 See A.N. Licht, `The Mother of all Path-Dependencies: Towards a Cross-Cultural
Theory of Corporate Governance Systems' (2001) 26 Delaware J. of Corporate
Law 147±205.
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emerge, it becomes evident to which degree `comparative corporate governance'103 is being transformed into an inter-disciplinary regulatory analysis.
Our focus on the way in which corporate governance principles are
migrating between different national political economies, on the one hand,
and newly forming regulatory spaces,104 on the other, informs and
accentuates our perceptions not only for the existing differences in national
corporate laws, but more importantly for the fact that conventionally viewed
`national corporate governance systems' have long become transnationally
constituted spaces of institutional and normative interaction and contestation. They are, thus, anything but peaceful, embedded legal orders. Instead,
they are marked by a fundamental regulatory transformation in which social
norms and `soft law' become intertwined, changed, adapted, and interwoven
within a regulatory environment of `hard' law which itself is no longer
stable.
The case of corporate governance reform, which I have highlighted in
this paper, illustrates the degree to which the contested issues and the
successively made proposals that grew out of a far-reaching and open-eyed
gathering of information and evidence by national and supranational policy
makers, expert committees, and scholars were of a veritable transnational
nature, emerging from parallel reform efforts in other countries, among
private and non-state actors around the world. In that sense, domestic
company law reform must be seen as part of an emerging transnational legal
pluralism. Its defining feature is the fundamental contestation of the very
distinction that legal pluralism has always struggled with: that between law
and non-law.
CONCLUSION
Corporate governance norms provide a telling example of the transformation
of traditional state-originating, official norm setting in favour of increasingly
decentralized, multi-level processes of norm production. At the same time,
not only are norms produced on more levels: the nature of these norms
themselves changes dramatically. This constellation, however, suggests
nothing less than a fundamental contestation and erosion of boundaries
between state and non-state actors, between official and unofficial law,
between public and private ordering, and it is here where we see a recurrence
but also a reformulation of Polanyi's astute observations as to the pressures
103 M.J. Roe, `Comparative corporate governance' in The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law, ed. P. Newman (1998) 339±46.
104 M. Amstutz, `In-Between Worlds: Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in
Legal Reasoning' (2005) 11 European Law J. 766±84; see, also, M. Amstutz and V.
Karavas, `Rechtsmutation: Zu Genese und Evolution des Rechts im transnationalen
Raum' (2006) Rechtshistorisches J. 14±32.

73
ß 2011 The Author. Journal of Law and Society ß 2011 Cardiff University Law School

on market regulation to answer to the dynamics of what he called the danger
of disembedding the market from society and of the `double movement' of
both emancipatory and containing liberalization.105 The novelty of this
blurring of boundaries between traditional norm creating and executing
spheres appears as a direct result of a specific historical experience of a
particular framework of socio-economic, political-legal regulation that
characterized the twentieth-century rise of the social and welfare state.106
This experience was aptly identified and premeditated by turn-of-the-century
sociologists and lawyers, and powerfully captured by Max Weber's sobering
assessment of the disenchantment of modernity.107 Irredeemably thrown into
the iron cage of modern rationalization,108 contemporary hopes are pinned ±
if at all ± on a transformative realization of emerging self-regulatory
potentials. Current attempts to rethink legal regulation as `regulatory
governance', `regulatory capitalism', or `rough consensus and running code'
should be seen in this light.
The framework of transnational corporate governance regulation can only
be understood against the background of, and in light of, the complex,
intertwined nature of corporate governance regulation as it unfolds in a
context marked by tensions between national and, for example, European
aspirations for market competitiveness, market and polity integration
dynamics, and the increasingly transnational nature of firms' operations
and regulations. A viable theory of transnational law making must seek to
acknowledge these contextual tensions and draw on the various learning
experiences with regard to market regulation in order to integrate them
productively into an enriched concept of regulatory governance. Such a
theory might then be able to capture the particular dynamics of transnational
corporate governance regulation through its structuring capacities for
distinguishing between the substantive and procedural dimensions of contemporary norm creation. The particular promise of a theory such as RCRC
here lies in its capacity to draw conceptual lines between the experi-

105 Polanyi, op. cit., n. 33.
106 N. Luhmann, Political Theory in the Welfare State, tr. by J. Bednarz Jr. (1990); M.
Stolleis, `Die Entstehung des Interventionsstaates und das oÈffentliche Recht' (1989)
11 ZNR 129±47.
107 M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, tr. by T. Parsons
(1930); M. Weber, On Law in Economy and Society, tr. by E. Shils and M.
Rheinstein (1967); D. Trubek, `Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism'
(1972) Wisconsin Law Rev. 720±53; R. WiethoÈlter, `Proceduralization of the
Category of Law' in Critical Legal Thought: An American-German Debate, eds. C.
Joerges and D. Trubek (1985) 501±10; G. Teubner, `Substantive and Reflexive
Elements in Modern Law' (1983) 17 Law & Society Rev. 239±85; G.-P. Calliess,
Prozedurales Recht (1999); P. Zumbansen, Ordnungsmuster im modernen
Wohlfahrtsstaat. Lernerfahrungen zwischen Staat, Gesellschaft und Vertrag (2000).
108 R. Sennett, The Culture of the New Capitalism (2006); T. Judt, Ill Fares the Land
(2010).
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mentation with norm-creating processes, which are understood as contextualized learning processes (`rough consensus'), on the one hand, and the
assessment of emerging normative bodies on the other (`running code'). The
promise of RCRC lies in its sensitivity with regard to knowledge emanating
from concrete regulatory contexts that are recognized as norm proposals.
Within the process of disseminating such norm proposals, they are gradually
evolving into programmes of regulation. Emerging into a still-evolving
running code, such norm programmes remain fully assessable from any
factual or normative standpoint, while not sacrificing their ongoing regulatory function. As such, this model strives ± not unlike competing governance
concepts ± for coherence, applicability and, ultimately, legitimacy.
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